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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

HOLLI M. MAHOSKEY, and
CHARLES MAHOSKEY,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Case No. 900190

vs.
OGDEN CLINIC, DR. BOYD J.
FARR, and DR. CHRIS
CHRISTENSEN,

Priority No. 16

Defendants/Appellees.
00O00

BRIEF OF APPELLEES DR. BOYD J. FARR AND OGDEN CLINIC

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction to hear this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Anno. Section 78-2-2 (3) (j) (1989).
STATEMENT

OF

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND
OF APPELLATE REVIEW

STATEMENT

Whether the lower court properly determined that there were
no genuine issues of material fact and that defendants were
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff had
knowledge

of

negligence

an

more

injury,
than

its

two

cause

years

and

the

before

possibility

of

commenced

her

the standard

for

she

malpractice action.
The

Supreme

Court of Utah has stated

appellate review of summary judgments as follows:

"In reviewing a summary judgment, this Court will view the
facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion
and will allow
is

entitled

the summary judgment to stand only if the movant

to

summary

undisputed facts."

judgment

as

a matter

of

law

on

the

Barlow Society v. Commercial Security Bank,

723 P.2d 398, 399 (Utah 1986).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The statute of limitations governing this case is contained
in Utah Code Anno. Section 78-14-4 (1) (1979):
(1) No medical malpractice action against a
health care provider may be brought unless it
is commenced within two years after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through
the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the injury, whichever first
occurs...
(Addendum P. A - 8 ) .
The

statute

addressing

bifurcation

of

trials

in

medical

malpractice cases is contained in Utah Code Anno. Section 78-1247 (1971):
In any action against a physician. . . for
professional negligence or for rendering
professional services without consent, if the
responsive pleading of the defendant pleads
that the action is barred by the statute of
limitations, and if either party so moves
the court, the issue raised thereby may be
tried separately and before ciny other issues
in the case are tried...
(Addendum P. A - 8 ) .
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is set forth in
the addendum, P. A-9.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a.

Nature of the case.
This appeal is from a Second Judicial District Court order

granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Dr. Boyd J.
Farr,

Dr.

plaintiff
failure

Chris

Christensen,

and

Ogden

Clinic,

Holli Mahoskey's medical malpractice

dismissing

complaint

to comply with the two year statute of

for

limitations

contained in Section 78-14-4 (1) Utah Code Anno. (1979).
b.

Course of proceedings.
Holli Mahoskey served a Notice of Intent to Commence Action

on defendants

on November

1, 1988, alleging

that they were

negligent in failing to diagnose her breast cancer.
complaint on February 24, 1989.
was also listed as a plaintiff.

She filed a

Her husband, Charles Mahoskey,
(R. at 1).

Dr. Christensen filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
stating, inter alia, that it was time-barred on its face under
Section 78-14-4(1).

In response, Plaintiff requested leave of

court to file an amended complaint alleging compliance with the
statute.

Judge Ronald 0. Hyde granted plaintiff's motion and an

amended complaint was filed on May 8, 1989.
Defendants

each

filed

motions

to

(R. at 81).
dismiss

the

amended

complaint, alleging failure to comply with the statute of limitations, failure to state a cause of action for Charles Mahoskey
and failure to state grounds for punitive damages.

-3-

Plaintiff did

not respond or object to defendants' motions regarding dismissal
of Charles Mahoskey and the punitive damages claim.

Following

argument on the limitations issue, Judge Hyde ruled that the
allegations of the amended complaint were sufficient to leave
open the question of whether plaintiff had complied with the
statute.

Defendant Christensen filed a motion for separate

trial on the limitations issue on July 14, 1989, which motion was
stipulated to by plaintiff.

(R. at 134).

Holli Mahoskey's deposition was taken on September 29, 1989.
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment thereafter, alleging

Ms. Mahoskey's testimony established that she had know-

ledge of a legal injury more than two years before her suit was
commenced.
c.

(R. at 170, 175).

Disposition at Trial Court.
Judge Hyde issued a ruling granting defendants' motions on

November 15, 1989, finding that plaintiff had knowledge of an
injury, its cause, and the possibility of negligence in July,
1985.

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, or in

the Alternative, Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order, asking
the court to set aside its ruling until the matter could be heard
on oral argument. Following argument by all parties on December
8, 1989, the court ruled that summary judgment was proper and
that plaintiff's claims were barred under Section 78-14-4 (1) as
a matter of law.
1990.

Summary Judgment was entered on January 17,

(R. at 170, 175).

On January 23, 1990 Plaintiff filed another Motion to Alter
-4-

or Amend Order of Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion
for Relief from Order of Summary Judgment, on the grounds that a
new case, Chapman v. Primary Children's Hospital, 784 P. 2d 1181
(Utah 1989) had been issued by the Supreme Court of Utah since
the time of the Court's ruling.
summary judgment.

Judge Hyde affirmed the order of

The Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Alter

or Amend Summary Judgment and Order Denying Motion for Relief
from Summary Judgment was entered on March 16, 1990.
filed a Notice of Appeal on April 16, 1990.

Plaintiff

(R. at 381).

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Holli Mahoskey, 25, found a small lump in her breast in
February, 1985. (Plaintiff Holli Mahoskey's Deposition at 7; R.
at 150).

She scheduled a check-up appointment with her OB-GYN,

Dr. Boyd K. Farr of the Ogden Clinic, for April 3, 1985, to have
the

lump

examined

for

malignancy.

Dr. Farr

had

been Ms.

Mahoskey's physician since her first pregnancy in 1981.

He had

delivered her two children and performed her annual physical
exams.

At each appointment he had instructed her to check her

breasts at least once a month for lumps and explained how to
perform the procedure.

(Plaintiff's Depo. at 4, 5 and 6; R. at

147-149).
Dr. Farr examined the lump and attempted its aspiration,
without success. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 8). He called in Dr.
Chris Christensen, a general surgeon with the Ogden

Clinic, to

also examine the lump. Ms. Mahoskey informed both doctors that

-5-

she

had

family.
was

a history

of

cancer, but

not breast

(Plaintiff's Depo. at 7; R. at 150).

aware

of

tests

that were

cancer was present, including

available

to

cancer, in her
At that time she

determine

mammograms, X-rays

and

whether
surgical

biopsies. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 12; R. at 151).
The

lump was

testified

that

she

not
was

diagnosed

as

instructed

cancerous.
to

Ms. Mahoskey

continue

regular

self-

examinations of the lump and to come back in three months to have
the

lump

re-checked.

No

further

tests

were

ordered.

(Plaintiff's Depo. at 12; R. at 151).
The size of the lump remained unchanged until July 1985, at
which time it began growing. (Plaintiff's
152).

Depo. at 15; R. at

Ms. Mahoskey contacted Dr. James Gardner because she had

grown suspicious of Dr. Farr and Dr. Christensen and because she
wanted a second opinion. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 18, 46 and deposition correction sheet; R. at 153, 161). Dr. Gardner examined the
lump on July 15, 1985 and found it to be three times its earlier
measurement.

in aspirating

the lump and

stated that it definitely needed to be biopsied.

A biopsy was

performed
cancerous.
Mahoskey's

on

He was unsuccessful

July

17, 1985 which

revealed

that the mass

(Plaintiff's Depo. at 16-17; R. at 222, 223).
right

breast

was

mastectomy on July 19, 1985.

removed

by

modified

was
Ms.

radical

(Plaintiff's Depo. at 18; R. at

153).
On the day her cancer was diagnosed, Ms. Mahoskey asked Dr.
Gardner why Dr. Farr and Dr. Christensen did not do something

-6-

three months earlier.

Dr. Gardner stated that he did not know

why they did not do anything. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 18; R. at
153).

On August 5, 1985 she asked Dr. Alton Wagnon, who perform-

ed her chemotherapy, why the doctors did not catch this three
months earlier and whether she would not have had to go through
what she did.

Dr. Wagnon told her that if the cancer had been

diagnosed earlier there would have been a good chance that she
could

have

mastectomy.

had

a

lumpectomy

rather

than

a modified

radical

(Plaintiff's Depo. at 37-38; R. at 239,240).

Ms.

Mahoskey was angry with Dr. Farr and Dr. Christensen at that time
and felt they had made a mistake and should have diagnosed the
cancer in April. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 38-39; R. at 240, 241).
She has felt since July, 1985 that an early diagnosis would have
made a difference in her case. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 36; R. at
158).

No doctor has ever told her that an earlier diagnosis

would not have made a difference. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 38; R. at
159) .
Ms. Mahoskey underwent a sterilization procedure in August,
1985.

She asked Dr. Conrad Monson if the doctors had caught the

cancer three months earlier whether she would be going through
what she was experiencing at that time.

He looked at her and did

not say anything. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 27; R. at 233).
Ms. Mahoskey had chemotherapy through February, 1986.
was sick during her chemotherapy.

She

(Plaintiff's Depo. at 29; R.

at 235).
Ms.

Mahoskey

testified

that
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she

knew

Dr.

Farr

and

Dr.

Christensen had "screwed up" on her case, but that it was not on
her mind every day.
until

her

She did not really start thinking about it

chemotherapy

ended

in

February,

1986.

(Plaintiff's

Depo. at 57; R. at 165).
Two

and

a half

years

later, Ms. Mahoskey

consulted

Dr.

Stephen Ralston, a plastic surgeon, regarding breast reconstruction.

She began considering a lawsuit following the September

9, 1988 consultation because she could not afford the reconstructive

procedure

and

thought

the

lawsuit

might

help

cover

the

expense of surgery. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 55-56; R. at 163, 164).
Plaintiff consulted an attorney regarding her claim against
defendants in October, 1988. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 25-26; R.
at

231,

232).

Ms. Mahoskey

testified

that

the

information

regarding possible medical negligence that she possessed at the
time she discussed the lawsuit with her attorney was the same
information she had possessed in July, 1985. (Plaintiff's Depo.
at 28-29; R. at 156, 157).
Ms. Mahoskey served a Notice of Intent to Commence Action on
defendants on November 1, 1988. (R. at 2 ) .

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah

law

requires

a

plaintiff

to

commence

a

medical

malpractice action within two years after a patient or plaintiff
discovers,

or

through

the

use of

have discovered, a legal injury.
Ms.

Mahoskey's

deposition

reasonable

should

Judge Hyde correctly ruled that

testimony
-8-

diligence

established

she

had

knowledge

of

her

injury,

negligence in July, 1985.

its

cause

and

the

possibility

of

Plaintiff waited 39 months after her

diagnosis before serving her Notice of Intent to Commence Action
on defendants for failure to diagnose her breast cancer.
case

was

initiated more

than

15 months

after

the statute

Her
of

limitations had expired and is time-barred under Utah Code Anno.
Section

78-14-4

(1) (1979).

The fact that plaintiff

did not

receive expert confirmation of her opinions of negligence did not
toll the statute from running on her claim.
An independent trial on the statute of limitations would not
be justified here.
on

the

There are no material issues of disputed fact

limitations

question,

judgment as a matter of law.

and

defendants

are

entitled

Summary judgment was

to

correctly

granted and the order dismissing plaintiff's complaint should be
affirmed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT PLAINTIFF
HAD KNOWLEDGE OF A LEGAL INJURY IN 1985 AND
THAT HER LAWSUIT IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
The statute of limitations governing medical
actions

in

Utah

requires

a

plaintiff

to

commence

malpractice
a

lawsuit

"within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or
through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered
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the injury, whichever first occurs..."
78-14-4 (1) (1979).

Utah Code Anno. Section

The Supreme Court of Utah has held that the

two year statute begins to run "when an injured person knows or
should know that he has suffered a legal injury,."
Ballincrer. 601 P. 2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979).

Foil v.

Discovery of a "legal

injury" under the statute has been defined by the Court as
"discovery of injury and the negligence which resulted in the
injury."

Id. at 148.

Ms. Mahoskey acknowledges that the first prong of the Foil
test was met here - she did have knowledge of her injury in 1985
when her cancer was diagnosed and her breast removed.

Plaintiff

argues, however, that she did not have knowledge of the possibility that negligence caused her injury until moret than three
years later.

While plaintiff states that she was angry with Dr.

Farr and felt he had made a mistake and should have diagnosed her
cancer earlier, she maintains that she cannot be held to have
possessed knowledge of possible negligence for three reasons:
she never received a medical opinion confirming her suspicions of
negligence, she was not informed of her cause of action by an
attorney until
reasonably

be

1988, and because she was ill and could not
expected

to

pursue

her

investigation

until

September, 1988. Her argument fails on each point.

A.

The Statute of Limitations Began to Run When
Plaintiff Discovered Her Injury and Attributed its
Cause to the Possible Necrlicremce of Defendants.

-10-

The question of when a plaintiff is held to possess knowledge of a "legal injury" under the Foil test was addressed by
Judge David Winder

in Hargett v. Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152

(D.Utah 1984), reversed on other grounds, 801 F. 2d 368 (10th
Cir. 1986).

Hargett parallels the present case in that both were

summary judgment cases involving the alleged failure to diagnose
a disease.

In Hargett, a mother asked a doctor to examine her

sick infant several times within one week.

At each examination

the doctor concluded that the child had a viral infection that
would eventually run its course.

A later spinal tap revealed

the child was in fact suffering from meningitis.

The boy was

immediately hospitalized and suffered serious injuries.
The boy's mother stated in her deposition that at the time
her son was diagnosed with meningitis, she felt the severity of
the illness may have been exacerbated by the doctor's failure to
diagnose it earlier, and that she felt the doctor may have been
negligent.

She also testified that she had expressed those

thoughts to a doctor upon the child's arrival at the hospital.
The

Court

concluded

that

those

deposition

statements

established that she discovered the boy had suffered a legal
injury

on

meningitis.

the

day

she

was

informed

of

the

diagnosis

of

The Court rejected her arguments that she did not

have knowledge of a "legal injury" because she had no medical
training, had been informed by a doctor that her claim could not
be legally proven, and because she did not consult an attorney
for four years.

Judge Winder said:
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Under Foil, and its progeny, a legal determination of
negligence is not necessary to start the statute of
limitations. Rather, the crucial question is whether
the plaintiff was aware of the facts that would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that he may have a cause
of action against the health care provider. See, e.g.,
Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 99 (Utah 1982); Hove v.
McMaster, 621 P. 2d 694, 696 (Utah 1980) Foil. 601
P. 2d at 148. Those facts include the existence of an
injury, its cause and the possibility of negligence.
Hargett, at 155.

Since the plaintiff had failed to initiate her

lawsuit within two years of discovering

the injury, summary

judgment on the statute of limitations was found proper.
Applying the analysis of Hargett here, it is evident from
Ms. Mahoskey's deposition statements that she had knowledge of
"the existence of an injury, its cause and the possibility of
negligence" on July 17, 1985.

It is undisputed she was informed

of her cancer on that date and testified she was angry with Dr.
Farr for not diagnosing it earlier.

Ms. Mahoskey has felt since

1985 that an earlier diagnosis of her cancer could have resulted
in a different outcome.

She has stated that she felt defendants

"screwed up" on her case, but did not really start thinking about
it until after her chemotherapy ended in 1986.

She has further

testified she was aware at that time of medical procedures that
existed to determine whether cancer was present.

She knew her

cancer had been diagnosed through a biopsy by Dr. Gardner and
that

a

biopsy

examination.

had

not

been

performed

during

her

Indeed, she discussed the earlier examination with

Dr. Gardner on the day her cancer was diagnosed.

Her deposition

statements about that conversation are as follows:
Q.

April

Was

there

any

discussion
-12-

with

[Dr.

Gardner] as to whether it should have been
biopsied back in April?
A*
Yes, there was.
Q.
What did he tell you or what did you tell him?
A.
I said, Well, three months ago when I
was here, why didn't they—why didn't they
do something then?
And he just—he didn't
say anything.
Q.
Just didn't answer at all o r —
A.
He just says I don't know why they
didn't do anything.
(Plaintiff's Depo. at 18; R. at 153).
Accordingly, Ms. Mahoskey's testimony establishes
July

17, 1985 she was

that on

"aware of the facts that would

lead a

reasonable person to conclude that he may have a cause of action
against the health care provider".

Hargett, at 155.

Nothing

more is required to start the statute of limitations running.
B.

Plaintiff's Failure to Obtain Medical and Legal
Opinions of Negligence Did Not Prevent the Statute of
Limitations From Running on Her Claim.

Plaintiff argues that despite her deposition statements, she
did not have knowledge of possible medical negligence because her
physicians

did

not

confirm

her

lay

suspicions

of negligence.

This argument was recently rejected by the Utah Court of Appeals
in Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
In

Deschamps

a

plaintiff's

mother

was

prescribed

drugs

which allegedly resulted in the woman's developing vasculitis.
An attorney was hired to investigate the woman's medical care
shortly before her death in 1984. He filed a Notice of Intent to
Commence Action after the woman died.

The attorney sought an

expert opinion on the quality of care rendered and was informed
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by a physician that his client had no grounds for a malpractice
claim.

He relayed the expert opinion to his client and closed

his file.
The daughter continued

to feel uneasy

about the events

surrounding her mother's death and hired a new attorney who
obtained

an expert

opinion

daughter's suspicions

in May, 1986 that confirmed the

of negligence.

The attorney

served a

Notice of Intent and a complaint was filed in January, 1988. The
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendcmts, finding
that the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the
claim more than two years prior to filing her action..
On appeal, the plaintiff

argued

(similar to plaintiff's

reasoning here), that "she could not know of the legal injury
under section

78-14-4 until she obtained

a favorable expert

opinion confirming her lay suspicion of negligence."
at 473.

The Court rejected that argument.

Deschamps,

Citing Hove v.

McMaster, 621 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980), Floyd v. Western Surgical
Assocs. Inc. 773 P. 2d 401 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), and Hargett v.
Limberg, 598 F. Supp. 152 (D. Utah 1984), the Court concluded:
If we accepted [the plaintiff's] position that she
could not know of her legal injury until she received
an expert medical opinion confirming malpractice, the
statute would be tolled in every case until a plaintiff
not only decided to seek, but found expert medical
testimony. We do not believe this result is consistent
with the purpose of the statutory scheme.
Deschamps, at 475.

Summary judgment dismissing the suit was

accordingly affirmed.
In similar fashion, the fact that Ms. Mahoskey's physicians
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did not confirm her suspicions of negligence, did not prevent the
statute

from

running

Mahoskey's

statements

subsequent

treating

on

her

claim.

regarding

her

physicians

Even

if

each

conversations

is viewed

in the

of Ms.

with

her

light most

favorable to her position, those statements do not excuse her
three year delay in commencing her suit.

She was never informed

by any physician that an earlier diagnosis would not have made a
difference

in

her

case.

She

has

certainly

never

raised

allegations of fraudulent concealment of facts regarding her
medical care. Indeed, she possessed the same facts regarding her
treatment in 1985 as she did in 1988.
those

facts, the

diagnosed

and

statute began running when her cancer was

she

associated

negligence of defendants.
because

she

Based on her knowledge of

failed

to

her

injury

with

the

alleged

The limitations period was not tolled
receive

expert

medical

opinions

of

negligence.
Nor was the statute tolled because Ms. Mahoskey was not
informed

of

her

cause

of

action

contacted an attorney in 1988.

for malpractice

until

she

As noted above, this issue was

addressed by Judge Winder in Haraett. where the plaintiff opposed
a motion for summary judgment by alleging the physicians she
consulted had led her to conclude her claims could not be legally
proven.

The plaintiff argued, as Ms. Mahoskey does here, that as

a lay person she accordingly could not have discovered a legal
injury until she consulted an attorney, four years later.

Judge

Winder ruled "that argument is without merit and confuses legal
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injury with a legal conclusion of negligence".
155.

Hargett, at 154-

It was the facts known to the plaintiff, including her

opinions of negligence, that were determinative in calculating
when

the

statute began running, not when the plaintiff was

informed of her cause of action.

In this case, Judge Hyde

correctly ruled that Ms. Mahoskey obtained

knowledge of

facts

sufficient to start the limitations period running on her claim
in 1985, not in 1988 when she requested legal advice.
C.

The Statute of Limitations was Not Tolled Until
Plaintiff Resumed Her Normal Activities.

Ms.

Mahoskey

argues

that

she

was

unable

to

function

normally until August, 1988 and that the statute of limitations
was therefore tolled

until September of that year.

She states

that at that time she discovered, through reasonable diligence,
that there was a possibility of negligence by defendants.

She

cites to no facts that she discovered at that time that led her
to form that conclusion.

Indeed, Ms. Mahoskey has testified that

she received no new information between 1985 and the time she
consulted a lawyer in October, 1988.
As stated above, Ms. Mahoskey's testimony shows she had
knowledge

of

an

injury,

negligence in 1985.

its

cause

and

the

possibility

of

To toll the statute until the time she

states she resumed her normal activities would render the statute
meaningless.

By definition the statute at issue here requires an

injury before it starts

running.

It is assumed, therefore, that

all such cases would have at least some period of illness or
-16-

disability

following the injury.

tolled

a

to

activities

date
were

a plaintiff
resumed

To allow the statute to be

designates

would

make

subjective and governed by a plaintiff's

as

the

the

time

statute

normal

entirely

own determination as to

when discovery of a legal injury was reasonable.
Statutes
principles.
17

et

of

limitation

are

founded

upon

good

and

fair

See 51 Am. Jur. 2d. Limitations of Actions, Section

seq.

(1970).

They

are

enacted

to

ensure

claims

are

advanced within a reasonable time so an opposing party has a
fair opportunity to defend against them.
exemptions

from

the

bar

of

the

Statutory and case law

statute

exist

situations; none of those exceptions apply here.

in

numerous

Ms. Mahoskey

failed to commence her action within the time frame designated by
the legislature and her suit is time-barred as a matter of law.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT
THERE ARE NO DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL
FACT REQUIRING TRIAL AND THAT DEFENDANTS ARE
ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A.

Summary Judgment is a Viable and Necessary Judicial
Remedy and was Properly Applied Here.

Defendants

agree

with

plaintiff's

summary judgment procedures and cautions.
however,

that

the

granting

of

summary

general

analysis

It should be noted,
judgment

to

a

entitled thereto is not discretionary with the trial court.
56 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, in part:
-17-

of

party
Rule

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving part is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
(Addendum, P. A-9) (Emphasis added).
As noted in Utah cases, summary judgment has the salutary
purpose of eliminating the time, trouble and expense of a trial
that would be to no avail.
(Utah 1980).

McBride v. Jones, 615 P. 2d 431, 432

It is essential to the court in enabling it to

pierce the pleadings

to determine whether

there

is a genuine

issue to present to the fact finder. Reagan Outdoor Adv. Inc. v.
Lundgren, 692 P. 2d. 776 (Utah 1984)
The trial

court concluded

that Ms. Mahoskey's

deposition

statements establish she had knowledge of her legal injury more
than

two

years

prior

to

filing

suit.

Summary

judgment

was

accordingly mandated on those facts and properly ordered under
the requirements of Rule 56.
B.

There Are No
Genuine Issues of Material
Fact That
Would Preclude Summary Judgment on the Statute of
Limitations.

Plaintiff argues that "the District Court did not construe
the facts as presented by plaintiff
summarily
defendants

rejected
have

them."
denied

in any way, but

(Plaintiff's brief
negligence

in

at 15).

plaintiff's

treatment, that issue was not before the trial court.
all facts presented were limited to the question
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instead,
While
medical
Instead,

of when Ms.

Mahoskey had knowledge of her legal injury.

The facts were

accordingly not in dispute, nor was plaintiff's presentation of
the facts rejected by the court as she contends.

Defendants

supplemented the statement of facts set forth by plaintiff, but
the additional facts were taken exclusively from Ms. Mahoskey's
deposition statements.

They were presented to give the court a

complete summary of the facts known to plaintiff regarding her
legal injury.
Judge
establish

Hyde
that

ruled

that

those

Holli

Mahoskey

negligence by defendants in 1985.

facts, taken

knew

of

the

as

a whole,

possibility

of

Even with each fact construed

in her favor, it is undisputed that her cancer was diagnosed in
July, 1985, that she knew it had not been diagnosed by defendants
in April, that she knew additional diagnostic tests had not been
ordered, that she was angry with defendants and concluded they
had made a mistake, and that she felt if her cancer had been
diagnosed earlier she may have been able to have less drastic
procedures than a mastectomy.
Ms. Mahoskey does not dispute that she had knowledge of
those facts in 1985.

Instead, her argument appears directed to

the significance she attached to those facts.

The statute of

limitations begins running when a plaintiff "discovers or should
have discovered, the injury."

It is difficult to conceive of a

factual situation that would more clearly trigger the statute of
limitations on a case of an alleged failure to diagnose than the
situation presented here.

If the statute is to survive as a real
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and

meaningful

enforced

on

doctrine

the

facts

in

malpractice

known

to

a

actions,

plaintiff,

it
and

must
not

be
the

plaintiff's reaction to those facts.
C.

Plaintiff's Affidavit Statements Do Not Create An Issue
of Fact Regarding Her Knowledge of Negligence.

A plaintiff's affidavit statements that he or she did not
have

knowledge

themselves,

of

give

the
rise

possibility
to

a

of

question

negligence
of

do

fact.

not,

This

in

Court

addressed the use of affidavits in opposing summary judgments in
Reiser v. Lohner. 641 P. 2d 93 (Utah 1982) wherein a plaintiff's
claims for personal injuries were dismissed for failure to comply
with the malpractice

statute of limitations.

The

plaintiff's

husband argued that summary judgment had been improperly granted
because he had filed an affidavit stating that he had only become
aware of
injury.

the extent

of his wife's problems a year after her

The Court held:
Mr. Reiser filed an affidavit wherein he
asserted a belief that his wife's disorders
were temporary and that he did not become
aware of any permanent damage until June,
1972. Such declaration of his belief was not
sufficient to raise an issue of fact.
Furthermore, the very acknowledgment that his
wife was suffering disorders as a result of
the incident (whether temporary or permannent) would show that plaintiffs should have
known that they had suffered legal injury at
the time of the cardiac arrest.

Id. at 100.
While the Reiser affidavit addressed knowledge of permanency
of injury, the same reasoning would apply to affidavits regarding
knowledge of possible negligence.
-20-

Ms.

Mahoskey

has

testified

that she concluded in 1985 that Dr. Farr made a mistake in not
diagnosing her cancer.

An issue of fact is not raised by her

later affidavit statement that she had no basis for that conclusion.

In Floyd v. Western Surgical Associates, 773 P. 2d 401

(Utah Ct. App. 1989), the Utah Court of Appeals held that where a
party takes a clear position in a deposition that is not modified
on cross examination, he may not then file an affidavit to raise
an issue of fact by contradicting his earlier testimony, unless a
satisfactory explanation of the discrepancy is provided.
In Floyd the plaintiff's deposition testimony

established

that his physician had informed him more than two years prior to
his commencing suit that he had performed more extensive surgery
than that which was authorized.

The plaintiff stated that he had

attributed his on-going symptoms to the additional
that time.

surgery at

He later sought to change his testimony by filing an

affidavit that controverted his earlier statements as to when he
discovered his symptoms were caused by the unauthorized surgery.
While

the

plaintiff

maintained

his

affidavit

statements

should be controlling on the issue, the Court of Appeals upheld
exclusion of the affidavit and found that the plaintiff had made
a connection between the additional surgery and his symptoms more
than two years prior to commencing his suit.

Summary judgment

was accordingly affirmed.
The Supreme Court of Utah has stated

"specific facts are

required to show whether there is a genuine issue for trial.

The

allegations of a pleading or factual conclusions of an affidavit
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are

insufficient

to

raise a genuine* issue of fact." Reagan

Outdoor Advertising, Inc v. Lundgren, 692 P. 2d. 776, 779 (Utah
1984).

If an issue of fact could be created solely by an

affiant's statements regarding discovery of negligence, summary
judgment would never be appropriate when affidavits addressing
knowledge

were

filed, and

all

limitations

discovery would necessarily require trial.

issues

addressing

Instead, as evidenced

by Floyd and Reiser, Utah courts take the position that it is the
facts known to a plaintiff that determine when a plaintiff knew
or should have known of the possibility of medical negligence,
and not a plaintiff's affidavit conclusions.
D.

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-47 Does Not
Abrogate Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

Plaintiff argues that Utah Code Anno. Section 78-12-47 (1953
as amended) raises a presumption in favor of trial on the statute
of limitations issue in malpractice suits.

The statute reads:

In any action against a physician . . . for
professional negligence or for rendering professional
services without consent, if the responsive pleciding of
the defendant pleads that the action is barred by the
statute of limitations, and if either party so moves
the court, the issue raised thereby may be tried
separately and before any other issues in the case are
tried...
(Addendum, P. A-7)
Defendants maintain that this statute was not intended to
bar summary judgment when the trial court is presented facts
enabling it to conclude as a matter of law that a plaintiff had
-22-

knowledge

of

a

legal

commencing suit.

injury

more

than

two

years prior to

The statute does not provide for

a trial

whenever lack of knowledge of negligence is raised.
In Reiser v. Lohner. supra, the plaintiffs argued that the
trial court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing their
claim because under Section 78-12-47 they were entitled to a jury
trial

on

the

limitations

issue.

The

Court

rejected

that

argument, stating "[t]he statute . . . permits an independent
trial on the limitations issue.

It is, however, like all other

issues, subject to summary judgment if no genuine issues of
material fact are raised".

Reiser, at 100.

Plaintiff cites Brower v. Brown, 744 P. 2d 1337 (Utah 1987)
as support for her position that a presumption exists in favor of
granting a party a trial on the issue of knowledge of negligence.
It should be noted, however, that summary judgment was reversed
in Brown only on the question of whether plaintiff had knowledge
that

her

adverse

symptoms

were

caused

by

an

an

improperly

performed hysterectomy.

The plaintiff had maintained that her

sister

similar

had

experienced

adverse

symptoms

following a

hysterectomy and that plaintiff had no knowledge of negligence
until she was informed

that she had a cause of action for

malpractice by an emergency room physician.

The Court concluded

that those facts raised an issue as to whether she should have
associated her symptoms with negligence and reversed the summary
j udgment.
The summary judgment was not reversed as to plaintiff's
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claims regarding a puncture wound in her leg that she received
during the same surgery.

By a divided Court Justice Zimmerman

held:
While it may be that there is a factual question
as
to when
plaintiff
knew
the
hysterectomy had been done improperly and was
causing her problems, there is no question
on the record that on October 22, 1980, when
plaintiff was wheeled out of the recovery
room and saw blood spurting from the wound in
her leg, she knew that she had received a
puncture wound that was not part of her
surgical procedure.
She inquired about the
wound and never received a satisfactory
explanation as to how it occurred. This was
enough, as a matter of law, to place her on
notice that she had received a legal injury.
Accordingly, I believe the trial court's
summary judgment on this issue should be
affirmed.
Id. at 1340. (Emphasis added).
In similar fashion, the diagnosis of Ms. Mahoskey's cancer
and removal of her breast coupled with her failure to receive a
satisfactory explanation regarding defendants7 examination, was
enough to place plaintiff on notice of
matter of law.

her legal injury as a

She was not entitled to a trial on that issue.

CONCLUSION
The

Plaintiff

has

failed

to

comply

with

statute of limitations for malpractice claims.

the

two

year

To allow this

suit to proceed would establish a subjective measure whereby a
plaintiff's reaction to facts, rather than the facts themselves,
would control when the statute begins to run.
order of summary judgment should be affirmed.
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The trial court's

Respectfully

Submitted this

/ day of August, 1990.

CAMPBELL & NEELEY

Rigffi&b w. C A M P B E L L
A ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
Dr. Boyd J. Farr and Ogden Clinic
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Richard W. Campbell, certify that on August

J

, 1990 I

served the attached Brief of Appellees Dr. Boyd J. Farr and Ogden
Clinic upon the parties listed below by mailing four copies by
first class mail, postage prepaid to the following:

Douglas M. Durbano
Paul H. Johnson
Attorneys for Appellant
4185 Harrison Blvd. #320
Ogden, Utah 84403
David W. Slagle
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
Attorney for Appellee
Dr. Chris Christensen
10 Exchange Place
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
DATED this

*y

day of August, 1990.

RlCHARlTW. CAMPBELL
Attorney for Appel!J/6es
Dr. Boyd J. Farr and
Ogden Clinic
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A D D E N D U M

i
RICHARD W. CAMPBELL #3627
CYNTHIA CAMPBELL #4286
CAMPBELL & NEELEY
Attorneys for Defendants
Ogden Clinic and Dr. Boyd J. Farr
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-3646
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HOLLI M. MAHOSKEY and
CHARLES MAHOSKEY,

:
:

Plaintiffs,

:
:

VS.

OGDEN CLINIC, DR. BOYD J. FARR ::
and DR. CHRIS CHRISTENSEN,
:
Defendants.
:
Defendants

Ogden

Clinic,

Christensen, having moved the
Utah

Rules

of

Civil

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil NO. 89-0901488
Judge Ronald O. Hyde

Dr.

Boyd J. Farr, and Dr. Chris

Court pursuant

Procedure

for

and

pleadings

premises, and

herein

having issued

for defendants

and

56 of the

summary judgment in their

favor and against plaintiffs, and the
files

to Rule

Court having

being

a ruling

fully

reviewed the

advised

in the

granting summary judgment

on November 15, 1989, and plaintiffs having filed

a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or in the Alternative, Motion
for Relief

from Judgment

or Order,

and the motions having been

set for oral argument,
WHEREFORE,
Honorable Ronald

the

motions

came

on

for

hearing

before the

0. Hyde on December 8, 1989; plaintiff Holli M.

Mahoskey was present and was represented by her attorneys Paul H.
Johnson and Douglas M. Durbano; defendant Dr. Chris Christensen,
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Recorded Book Jl ,0.(J

Page ..7.8.'}
I Indexed

I

MAHOSKEY V. OGDEN CLINIC et al.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 89-0901488
Page 2

was represented by his attorney David W. Slagle; defendants Ogden
Clinic and Dr. Boyd J. Farr were represented by their attorneys
Richard W.
presented

Campbell
by

each

and

Cynthia

party;

enters its order, based

Campbell;

oral

argument was

the Court having heard the arguments

upon the

Court's Ruling

on Defendants'

Motion, as follows:
The

statute

of

limitations

is not tolled until plaintiff

consults an attorney.

Evidence here indicates that the plaintiff

had knowledge

existence of

of the

an injury, its cause and the

possibility of negligence in July, 1985, and that
based solely

on information

is no evidence that the

her lawsuit is

she possessed in July, 1985.

defendants

did

anything

to

There

delay the

filing of this action.
There is

no genuine

issue of

any material fact that would

preclude the granting of summary judgment.

Plaintiff

has failed

to comply with the two year statute of limitations.
IT

IS

HEREBY

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

AND DECREED that Summary

Judgment is granted in favor of defendants Ogden Clinic, Dr. Boyd
J. Farr,
action.

and Dr.

Chris Christensen, with prejudice, no cause of

Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment or

in the

Alternative, Motion for Relief From Judgment or Order is denied.
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MAHOSKEY V. OGDEN CLINIC et al.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 89-0901488
Page 3

DATED this

/ (o

day of Decefober, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

^BLE RONALD 0. ?YDE
District Court Judgej

Approved asyto form:
Paul H. Johftson
Attorney for Plaintiffs

A-3

MAHOSKEY V. OGDEN CLINIC et al.
MAILING CERTIFICATE
Civil No. 89-0901488
Page 2

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby

certify that

I mailed

a true and correct copy of

the foregoing SUMMARY JUDGMENT, postage prepaid,

this |4

day

of December, 1989 to the following:
Paul H. Johnson
Douglas M. Durbano
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4185 Harrison Boulevard #320
Ogden, Utah 84403
David W. Slagle
Elizabeth King Brennan
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
Chris Christensen, M.D«
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

Penny Pac
Secretary
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DAVID W. SLAGLE A297 5
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Defendant
Dr. Chris Christensen
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HOLLI M. MAHOSKEY and CHARLES
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER
DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

HAHOSKEY,

Plaintiffs,
vs.
OGDEN CLINIC, DR. BOYD J.
FARR, and DR. CHRIS
CHRISTENSEN,

NO. 89-091488
Judge Ronald Hyde

Defendants.

On or about January 23, 1990, plaintiff, by and through her
attorney of record, filed her Motion to Alter or Amend the Prior
Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, a Motion for Relief from
Summary Judgment.

The Court reviewed plaintiff's Motion, the

supporting Memorandum, the Memoranda filed by counsel for
defendants, and the Reply Memorandum filed by plaintiff.
February 27, 1990, this Court issued its Ruling denying
plaintiff's Motions.

Accordingly, it is
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On

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's Motions to

Alter or Amend the Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative,
Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from summary Judgment, is hereby
denied.
DATED this

/£

day of March, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

RONALD 0. HYDE
DISTRICT JUDGE

3«ADWS\ 1022<*. 58i»\0rder
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;
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATS CF UTAH

)

: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Rebecca Boothe, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys
for defendant Chris Christensen, M.D. herein; that she served the
attached (proposed) Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion tc Alter or
Amend Summary Judgment and Order Denying Motion for Relief From
Summary Judgment (Case Number 89-0901458, Second Judicial
District Court) upon the parties listed below by placing a true
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to:
Douglas M. Durbano, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiffs
4185 Harrison Boulevard #320
Ogden, Utah 84403
Richard w. Campbell, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants Farr and Ogden Clinic
2485 Grant Avenue #200
Ogden, Utah 84401
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
/ L~

on the'£

day of March, 1990.

Rebecca Boothe
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this (p&

day of March,

1990.
NOTARY PUBLIC

Residing in the S t a t e of Uath
My Commission JElxpires :
HM-9M.LR.BK-.

A_7

«,.' Li** C»ty uran z± •
•, Cr>rnmiu»on Expires
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STATE OF UTAH

'

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-14-4(1) (1979)
Statute of limitations —

Exceptions —

Application

(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first
occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the
alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that:
(a)
In an action where the allegation against the
health care provider is that a foreign object has been wrongfully
left within a patient's body, the claim shall be barred unless
commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient
discoverss, or through the use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully
left in the patient's body, whichever first occurs: and
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient
has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a
health care provider because that health care provider has
affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged
misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one
year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use
of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent
concealment, whichever occurs first.

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-12-47 (1971)
78-12-47.
Separate trial of statute of limitations issue in
malpractice actions.
In any action against a physician and surgeon, dentist,
osteopathic physician, chiropractor, physical therapist,
registered nurse, clinical laboratory bioanalyst, clinical
laboratory technologist, or a licensed hospital, person, firm or
corporation as the employer of any such person for professionaal
negligence or for rendering professional services without
consent, if the responsive pleadings of the defendant pleads that
the action is barred by the statute of limitations, and if either
party so moves the court, the issue raised thereby may be tried
separately and before any other issues in the case are tried. If
the issue raised by the defense of the statute of limitations is
finally determined in favor of the plaintiff, the remaining
issues shall them be tried.
This act shall not be construed to be retroactive.
A-8

Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(a) For claimant.
A party seeking to recover upon a
claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from
the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for
summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon
all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party.
A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any
part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon.
The motion shall be
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing.
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as
to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion.
If on motion
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or
for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at
the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the
evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and
in good faith controverted.
It shall thereupon make an order
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy,
including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further
proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the
action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and
the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense
required.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred
to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by

A-Q

depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits.
When a motion for summmary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response,
by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.
If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable.
Should it appear
from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot
for resons stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may
make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith.
Should it appear to the
satisfaction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits
presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order
the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount of
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any
offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

A-10

